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Abstract
Is wave function monism, the view that the wave function com-
pletely describes physical objects, a sensible view? GRW, one can-
didate to solve the measurement problem, might be taken to be an
example of such view. I argue in this paper that it not so obviously
so. I first show that a bare version of wave function monism is impos-
sible, and even if one can construct monistic theories with additional
rules (but no additional ontologies), they are not to be taken seriously.
Instead, a preferable choice is that of a quantum theory in which phys-
ical objects are represented by entities in three–dimensional space or
in four-dimensional space-time.
1 Introduction
Let us define wave function monism as the view according to which the wave
function mathematically represents, in a complete way, fundamentally all
there is in the world. Can and should we take such a view seriously?
Erwin Schro¨dinger was one of the first proponents of such a view, but
he dismissed it after he realized it led to macroscopic superpositions for a
wave function evolving in time according to the equations that has his name.
The common wisdom is that to fix the problem of such superpositions there
are two alternatives: “either the wave function, as given by the Schro¨dinger
equation, is not everything, or is not right” [Bell 1987]. The deBroglie-Bohm
theory, now commonly known as Bohmian Mechanics1, takes the first option:
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the description provided by a Schro¨dinger-evolving wave function is supple-
mented by the information provided by the configuration of the particles.
The second possibility consists in assuming that, while the wave function
provides the complete description of the system, its temporal evolution is
not given by the Schro¨dinger equation. Rather, the usual Schro¨dinger evolu-
tion is interrupted by random and sudden “collapses”. The most promising
theory of this kind is the GRW theory, after the scientists that developed it:
Gian Carlo Ghirardi, Alberto Rimini and Tullio Weber [Ghirardi et al. 1986].
It seems tempting to think that in GRW we can be wave function monists
and avoid the problem of macroscopic superpositions just allowing for quan-
tum jumps.
In this paper I first argue that “bare” wave function monism is not possi-
ble. That is, we need more structure than the one provided just by the wave
function. As a response, monistic theories can be produced with such an
additional structure, but without this addition being ontological in nature.
I argue in reply that such “dressed-up” versions of wave function monism
are not sensible, since they compromise the acceptability of the theory as a
satisfactory fundamental physical theory. Therefore I maintain that:
• Strictly speaking it is not possible to interpret GRW monistically as a
theory about the wave function only;
• Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological
rules, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously.
Following the work in [Bassi et al. 2003], [Benatti et al. 1995],
[Goldstein 1998], [Du¨rr et al. 1997], [Allori et al. 2008], and [Allori 2007],
I maintain instead that it is better to regard GRW in particular, and any
fundamental physical theory in general, as theories in which physical objects
are represented by a mathematical object in three–dimensional space or in
space-time.
2 Bare Monism
In the following I present bare monistic GRW, discuss its problems and the
proposed solutions.
One of the main proponents of a monistic interpretation of GRW is David
Albert. He maintains that the wave function represents a real, physical field,
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“just like electromagnetic fields in classical electrodynamics” [Albert 1996].
One difference, though, is that the wave function lives in a much bigger
space than three–dimensional space: it lives in a space that combines all the
positions of all the particles in the universe. So, if there are N particles in
the universe, this space – called configuration space – has dimension M =
3N . This is what physical space really is. “And whatever impression we
have to the contrary (whatever impression we have, say, of living in a three-
dimensional space or in a four–dimensional space–time) is somehow flatly
illusory” [Albert 1996].
Clearly, not only it seems possible but also very natural to interpret GRW
as a theory about the wave function: Isn’t it the case that in the theory there
is just one fundamental equation that involves the wave function? And isn’t it
the case that when similar situations have happened in previous fundamental
physical theories (like classical mechanics) we interpreted those entities as
representing physical objects?
On the other hand, there are some problems. First, the fundamental
space is not the usual three–dimensional space anymore: rather, it is con-
figuration space. So we need to explain why it appears as if we live in a
three–dimensional space. Under the current assumption, we do not have
enough resources to get three–dimensional space without making use of the
very definition of configuration. In fact, if the theory concerns the behavior
of stuff in this space of dimension M , then the whole world is just mathe-
matically represented by a function in that space: the wave function is ψ(q),
where q belongs to RM . We might be tempted to regard the coordinates of
q as grouped into triples, representing the three spatial coordinates of the
N particles. But the only way we could accomplish the suggested partition
into triplets is to already know that the configuration can be divided as such,
and that amounts to assigning to the word “configuration” what we think it
means: collection of positions of particles. And this amounts to saying that
there are particles in three–dimensional space, implicitly adding them to the
furniture of the universe, something that we have explicitly denied from the
start. In short, if one wants to insist that the world is “made of”2 wave
functions, she needs to specify some rule or map from the M -dimensional
space to three–dimensional space.
Connected to this problem, we should also explain why the world is as
2For simplicity, here and in the following I might use the locution “is made of” as short
for: “is mathematically represented by”.
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if there are (macroscopic) three–dimensional objects that move around in
three–dimensional space. We think that macroscopic objects have proper-
ties, among which to be located in some position in three–dimensional space,
or to have a given temperature, and so on. A fundamental physical theory
should be able to describe, at least in principle, the behavior and the motion
of these objects together with their properties, in one way or another. In
orthodox quantum mechanics there is a rule called the eigenstate–eigenvalue
rule (EER) that is used to talk about properties in connection with the wave
function: “an observable (i.e. any genuine physical property) has a well de-
fined value for a system S when and only when S’s quantum state is an
eigenstate of that observable”. In GRW the evolution for the wave function
is constructed by modifying the Schro¨dinger equation to get rid of macro-
scopic superpositions. As a consequence, the wave function of a macroscopic
object “collapses” very rapidly into one of the terms of the superposition
but, because of the properties of the stochastic equation, it has tails that are
never exactly zero. Since such a wave function is not an eigenstate of any
operator that is supposed to represent properties, we cannot use the usual
EER in GRW to determine the properties of macroscopic objects. So again,
bare monism fails, leaving macroscopic objects with indefinite properties.
3 Dressed-up Monism
Albert realizes these failures, and supplements GRW with certain rules to
solve the problems just seen. He first proposes [Albert 1996] that the Hamil-
tonian provides the required map to get three–dimensional space from con-
figuration space. Suppose that physical space is RM , where it happens to be
the case that M = 3N . The total Hamiltonian of the world is something
like the following: H = ∇2q + V (q), where q ∈ RM . Without any further
restrictions, this Hamiltonian could apply to a space of any dimension M .
But, Albert claims, it is an empirical fact of the world that the potentials V
should be written as V (q) =
∑
i<j V (|qi−qj|), where q = (q1, ..., qN), qi ∈ R3,
for any i = 1, ..., N . And this is what ensures us of the appearances of the
world as three–dimensional. The structure of the actual Hamiltonian, Albert
says, is what explains why we think we live in a three–dimensional space, and
there is no further explanation of why the Hamiltonian is the way it is, or
the dimensionality M of physical space is what it is (for example, there is no
explanation of why M cannot be any number but must be a multiple of 3.
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In particular, there is no further explanation of why M cannot be a prime
number3).
To solve the problem of indefinite properties, Albert and Loewer propose
to replace the EER rule with a different one. For the property of localization
of a macroscopic object, they put forward the following proposal: “particle x
is in region R” if and only if the proportion of the total square amplitude of
x’s wave function which is associated with points in R is greater than or equal
to 1−p”, where the parameter p is a conventional matter [Albert et al. 1996].
It is a supervenience rule, since it is a rule that explains how our talk about
macroscopic objects and properties (the macroscopic talk) supervene on the
talk in terms of wave function (the microscopic talk). In this way, they say,
it is possible to recover what we usually mean when we talk about localizable
objects on the macroscopic level and the appearances of those objects to be
localized while they are not.
Note that here neither of the rules implies any additional ontology in
any way. Rather, they are just practical rules that should be added for our
epistemic purposes.
4 GRW with a Primitive Ontology
In this section I would like to present a couple of completely different ap-
proaches, in which some mathematical object other than the wave function
is representing matter.
Upon reflection, the wave function, living in such an abstract space, does
not seem to be the right kind of object to describe physical objects. Rather,
given that matter appears to live in three–dimensional space and to evolve
in time, the obvious choice to represent it seems to be a mathematical ob-
ject in three–dimensional space, or in space-time! Such mathematical object
has been called the primitive ontology of the theory4. By definition, given
that it lives in configuration space and not in three–dimensional space, the
wave function is not a possible primitive ontology. For this reason, Albert’s
formulation of GRW could be called “GRW0”, since it does not have any
3This has been suggested by Tim Maudlin [Maudlin p.c.].
4See for example [Goldstein 1998], [Du¨rr et al. 1997], [Goldstein et al. unpublished],




John Stuart Bell expressed a similar idea in his [Bell 1987], and proposed a
“version” of GRW with a primitive ontology. Consider the space-time points
(xi, ti) in which the wave function collapses. One could call these events
“flashes”6. Bell’s proposal is to take these events as the primitive ontology
of the theory. For this reason, it seems appropriate to call this reformulation
of GRW “GRWf”7. The flashes happen randomly with a given temporal
frequency and their probability is determined (quantitatively) by the wave
function. In particular, once a particular history of the wave function has
been chosen in a given time interval, the set of the localization events in
space-time in such interval is determined8.
Gian Carlo Ghirardi – the ‘G’ in GRW – has proposed another GRW
theory with as primitive ontology the scalar field MΨ = MΨ(x, t) on three–
dimensional space, determined by the wave function [Bassi et al. 2003]. Since
the primitive ontology of this theory is the mass density field, this theory is
called “GRWm”.
Let me emphasize how all the quantum theories just described and other
fundamental physical theories are theories about the temporal evolution of
a primitive ontology. For example, in Newtonian mechanics the primitive
ontology is given by point-particles, whose time evolution is determined by
the Newton’s law of motion and the laws of the force. A similar thing happens
in Bohmian Mechanics: the primitive ontology is also given by particles,
whose law of motion is determined by the wave function. GRWf and GRWm
are theories with the same characteristics: in GRWm the primitive ontology
is given by the mass density field, whose law of motion that is determined
by the wave function. GRWf is directly formulated in a space-time, but one
can tell the story of the world in terms of flashes in space-time. In both
GRWf and GRWm the primitive ontology (flashes and mass density field,
respectively) evolves according to an equation governed by the wave function
that in turn evolves stochastically, while in Bohmian mechanics the wave
function evolves deterministically according to Schro¨dinger’s equation. This
5This name was introduced in [Allori et al. 2008].
6This name has been first suggested in [Tumulka 2006a]
7The names “GRWf” and (see later) “GRWm” were introduced in [Colin et al. 2006].
Other names has been proposed for GRWf, like for example “flash-GRW”, “flashy-GRW”
or “Bell-GRW”.
8See [Bell 1987], [Tumulka 2006a], and [Allori et al. 2008] for technical details about
GRWf.
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suggests that there is the following common structure: in these theories there
is always a primitive ontology that mathematically represents the microscopic
constituents of macroscopic physical objects, and there are other variables (in
the quantum case the wave function) whose role in the theory is to implement
the dynamics for the primitive ontology. The specification of the primitive
ontology and of these dynamical variables completely determines the theory9.
5 Objections to GRW with a Primitive On-
tology
Let me now present possible problems for GRWf and GRWm. and possible
ways to respond them.
The first charge is that GRWf and GRWm have the problem of explaining
what the wave function is: if physical objects are described by the primi-
tive ontology, the wave function has to be something else. But what? The
discussion above about the common structure between fundamental phys-
ical theories can help us answer this question. The wave function, in all
theories analyzed, has a common role: while the primitive ontology speci-
fies what physical objects are, the wave function specifies how physical ob-
jects move. For this reason, Detlef Du¨rr, Shelly Goldstein and Nino Zangh`ı
[Du¨rr et al. 1997] have proposed that the wave function should be intended
as a physical law. Objections have been raised to this view, especially by
Harvey Brown and David Wallace [Brown et al. 2005]. First of all, laws are
time independent, while the wave function evolves in time. Du¨rr, Goldstein
and Zangh`ı [Du¨rr et al. 1997] and more recently Shelly Goldstein and Stefan
Teufel [Goldstein et al. 2001] have anticipated and replied to this objection
claiming that even if it might be difficult to accept the wave function as a law
in the current theories, it will become straightforward once we reach a theory
of quantum cosmology in which the wave function is static. Another objec-
tion to the view of the wave function as a law focuses on the fact that there
seem to be multiple degrees of reality: there are material entities, the prim-
itive ontology, and there are nomological entities, the wave function. One
could avoid the problem endorsing a nominalist point of view for laws. As
9For more on this, and for a more comprehensive (but not exhaustive) list of all the
possible combinations of primitive ontologies, dynamical variables and evolution equations,
see [Allori et al. 2008], [Allori 2007].
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an alternative, one could maintain that laws exist as abstract entities. One
could insist in fact that, even if the view has problems, they are not strong
enough to make one abandon the view altogether. This, of course, needs to
be argued, and indeed it has10. Another possible option is to try to elimi-
nate the wave function completely from the theory, as it has been attempted
by Fay Dowker and collaborators [Dowker et al. 2004], [Dowker et al. 2004],
[Dowker et al. 2005], that have developed some toy models of quantum me-
chanics without using the wave function at all.
Another charge against GRWf and GRWm is that they are artificial: there
is just one equation in GRW, and it is about the wave function. What else
could describe physical systems? I think this objection is question begging:
the whole point is to establish whether in GRW there is only one evolution
equation or not, and if not, which one is fundamental. GRW0 assumes there
is just one equation, while GRWf and GRWm explicitly deny that. And one
cannot assume as a premise something that is supposed to be established.
Another objection to GRWf and GRWm could be that these theories add
the primitive ontology even though it is of no use: everything can be done
without it. Again, the argument is question begging: the very issue is to
determine whether it is possible to derive everything with the wave function
only. I am about to argue that the situation is not as described, so if I am
correct, this argument fails.
If it is not true that GRW0 is the most natural interpretation, one could
claim that it is the simplest in the sense that it postulates the existence of
just one thing, the wave function. In contrast, GRWf and GRWm postulate
also the existence of the primitive ontology. So, appealing to Occam’s razor,
GRW0 should be preferred. First of all, I think that this formulation of the
objection is misleading: also in GRWf and GRWm there is just the prim-
itive ontology in the physical world! Be that as it may, this is not a very
compelling argument, I think. In fact, the strength of this argument clearly
depends on whether one accepts Occam’s razor or not. One could argue,
contra Occam, that theory should be chosen on the basis of its explanatory
power, that is not necessary connected to its simplicity. One could therefore
claim that GRWf and GRWm are more explanatory or explain things better
than GRW0. In the next section we will see the amount of work GRW0 has
to, here let me focus on GRWf and GRWm. Both GRWf and GRWm are in
line with the traditional realistic interpretation of classical mechanics: there
10See [Maudlin 2007b] for a recent realist proposal about laws of nature.
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are microscopic entities in three–dimensional space, evolving in time. We do
not have to explain the appearance of three–dimensionality, since the world
is three–dimensional. Concerning macroscopic properties, there seem to be
no problems, since in principle we are in the same situation we were in the
classical framework. Arguably, in classical mechanics one can identify macro-
scopic properties more or less naturally given by how the fundamental objects
can clump together to form more complex bodies interacting in a variety of
ways. For example, suppose I want to account for the fact that a comet is an
object that has a given localization at a given time. In classical mechanics I
can do that in terms of the microscopic components of the comet and their
interaction with each other: there are such-and-such atoms that form such-
and-such compounds, that interact via such-and-such chemical bonding to
form a solid object whose motion (and therefore its localization at different
temporal instants) can be just as effectively described by the motion of its
center of mass. Similarly, a property like liquidity can be explained in terms
of the chemical bonding between the microscopic constituents, while trans-
parency can be explained in terms of the optical properties of the compound.
Also in GRWm and GRWf we start from a primitive ontology in space or
space-time. Therefore, also in these theories we should be able to recover (at
least in principle) all macroscopic properties of physical objects (temperature
of a gas, ductility of a metal, elasticity of material, transparency of glass, and
so on) with a transparent mathematical method. More generally, this should
be done for any theory with a primitive ontology11. An antireductionis could
object all this, but the point here is that in GRWf and GRWm we are not in
any way worse off than in classical mechanics. That is, whatever can be said
against reductionism in classical mechanics, in principle can be said for GRWf
and GRWm. But there seem to be no additional problem for reductionism
in these theories due just to the fact that they are quantum theories.
6 Objections to Dressed-up Monism
The main problem is that GRW0 is incredibly radical in an unnecessary way:
if less far-fetched alternatives work, why go radical? Even if we grant that
11Indeed, it has been done in the framework of Bohm’s theory in [Du¨rr et al. 2004] and
in [Allori 2002]. In the GRW framework, more work needs to be done. In any case, see
[Bassi et al. 2003] and [Goldstein et al. unpublished] for some related comments on the
matter.
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there are reasons to go that way, still the does not seem to provide a good
“mechanism of explanation”. And even if we set this issues aside, there are
worries about whether the monistic research program can ever get off the
ground.
The pictures of the world provided by GRWf and GRWm are, more or
less, not too revisionary: there is space-time and there are histories of the
primitive ontology in it. By contrast, the picture of the world given by GRW0
is at best extremely bizarre: physical space is a highly dimensional space, and
all there is is a material field in that space. All the complexity, all the variety,
all the individuality, all the multiplicity of things is in that object: planets,
stars, tables, chairs, apples, trees, cat, reptiles, electrons, quarks, humans,
aliens, me, you, Mother Theresa, George Bush, are not made of particles,
are not made of fields in three–dimensional space, rather they are “all there
together” somewhere meshed in the wave function. As also pointed out by
Bradley Monton[Monton 2002], GRW0 is even more radical than the brain-
in-a-vat scenario: at least in that case brains are in space-time, while in this
view there are basically no brains at all, since there are no individuals at all!
GRW0 seems far too revisionary than needed: it is possible that the world is
as described but there seem to be no reason to believe it is the case. In fact,
it seems we can do perfectly fine without GRW0: as we discussed, nothing
is deeply wrong with the alternative view that the world is actually three–
dimensional with three–dimensional objects moving around. As a matter of
methodology, I think that we should not opt for some radical view if there
are no strong reasons to reject less revisionary perspectives.
At any rate, this is not an argument that prevents in principle the monist
to find the rules she needs. Indeed, Albert has proposed his own rules, as we
have seen. Concerning his first proposal, arguments against the possibility
for the Hamiltonian to provide the correct rule of correspondence are given
in [Monton 2002]. I do not wish to focus on those arguments in this paper:
even if Albert’s argument is sound and the Hamiltonian could in principle
be enough to define a suitable rule, I still find the argument unconvincing.
In fact, let us grant Albert that the Hamiltonian is indeed enough to explain
why it seems to us that we are living in a three-dimensional world even if we
are not. What are the reasons for which the Hamiltonian is the way we write
it? It seems straightforward to me that the reason we use in physics books a
certain Hamiltonian, and not some other, is that we already assume that we
are in three–dimensional space, and not the other way round. That is, we do
not deduce the three–dimensionality of space from the fact that in the physics
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book we find a particular kind of Hamiltonian. Therefore, it seems that the
explanatory structure in Albert’s view is upside down: is it the structure
of the Hamiltonian that explains the appearance of the three–dimensional
world, or the existence of such a world that explains the structure of the
Hamiltonian?
There seems nothing to say about the effectiveness of proposed superve-
nience rule: it works. It allows us to define a clear rule of correspondence
between the microscopic language (in term of wave functions) and the macro-
scopic everyday language (in terms of macroscopic properties). But notice
that not only do we need to explain the appearances of three–dimensionality
and localizability, but also of all the other macroscopic properties. That is,
not only do we need to supplement the theory with the Hamiltonian rule
for three–dimensionality and the supervenience rule for localization: we also
need other rules to account for every single property we think a macroscopic
object (including “us”) can have! For example, not only is it the case that
my cup of coffee is localized on my table, but also my cup of coffee is a
cup of coffee – it has a particular shape. Also, as a matter of fact, my cup
of coffee is white, and it is fragile. In addition, not only am I localized in
my office in front of my computer and close to my cup of coffee, but also I
have the property of thinking certain thoughts. So GRW0 should be able to
account for all these properties, and many many more. The idea is to do so
introducing supervenience rules. For example: “An object is a cup of coffee
iff the wave function is localized in a cup-shaped region of three–dimensional
space.” To account for the color of an object, the situation is more compli-
cated since it requires us to talk about the light deflected by the object. But
both the object and the light are part of the wave function, so one needs
to find a way to accommodate this. The same situation (or maybe a more
complex one) arises for fragility, since it involves what would happen to the
object under certain circumstances. Not to mention the task of accounting
for mental properties (see later).
Therefore, at the end of the day it seems that GRW0 is more like a
research program rather than a fully developed account. There is of course
nothing particularly wrong with that, but it should be remembered that it
was maintained that GRW0 is simpler than the alternatives since it involves
just the wave function. Is it really so with all these rules?
Be that as it may, here is another concern: there is no deep justification
for the additional rules. In fact, the answer to the question “Why these
rules?” is nothing but “Because they work ”. The problem is therefore
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that the GRW0 account of macroscopic properties does not seem to provide
a genuine account of these properties at all. Let us contrast this with the
situation in GRWf and GRWm. As anticipated, in the framework of theories
with a primitive ontology we can explain macroscopic properties starting off
from three–dimensionality and compositionality (there is microscopic stuff
in space that evolves in time, and the macroscopic objects are composed of
this microscopic stuff): we have a clear “mechanism of explanation”. This is
not so in GRW0, in which one has to derive macroscopic properties without
three–dimensionality, without compositionality, without anything, just using
plenty of ad hoc rules.
To conclude, let us even grant Albert that his rules are plausible and
successful. I think that there is a deeper and bigger problem. In theories
with a primitive ontology, there seem to be no mystery about the fact that
there are individuals among the three–dimensional objects: they just seem
particular clusters of primitive ontologies. The only mystery there is (if
any, depending of what position one takes with respect to the mind-body
problem) is that (some of?) these individuals have conscious experiences. Of
course, if there is a problem here, there is a problem for every physical theory,
starting from classical mechanics. It is worth noting, though, that theories
with a primitive ontology do not need to solve the mind–body problem in
order to account for what (physically) happens in the world around us: they
simply leave it out from the beginning, claiming that all physics does is to
account for the behavior of material objects. In the case of GRW0 instead,
since physics ought to explain the appearances that we have, and since there
are (fundamentally) no individuals and no individual perceptions, the mind-
body problem is right in from the beginning and cannot be left out from
the discussion. Suppose I want to account for my seeing the motion of a
projectile in a gravitational field. In classical mechanics this is equivalent
to the request of accounting for the motion of a projectile in a gravitational
field. There is no need to invoke my visual perception of the projectile.
The evidence (i.e. the motion of the projectile) is stated in the language of
physical facts, and not in the language of experience. The same can be said
in the case of GRWf and GRWm. In GRW0, instead, one has to stick with
the original request and has to account for my perception of the motion of the
projectile to start with. Since in GRW0 there are no individual perceptions,
we need to account for the fact that it seems that there are such perceptions.
But this amounts to have solved the mind-body problem, which nobody
has a clear idea of how to do! If we don’t have a primitive ontology, the
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connection between physics and the behavior of ordinary objects has to be
made at the level of experiences. So one cannot avoid to discuss about how
conscious experiences come about. In other words, whether one considers the
gap between the physical and the mental in principle unsolvable by physics
or not, this issue has no implication for GRWf and GRWm, while this is
not the case for GRW0. Therefore, while GRWf and GRW are independent
to the mind-body problem, the success of GRW0 crucially depends on its
solution: if it cannot be resolved by physics the research program cannot
even start. This is a good reason for which it seems more sensible to choose
right from the beginning an ontology in three–dimensional space - that does
not require any mentioning of the mind-body problem - instead of having
an ontology in some abstract space and then find ourselves dealing with the
mind-body problem right from the beginning. To put it differently and to
sum up, there are two problems we have to face when we want to describe
the world around us: an “easy” one and a “difficult” one. The easy one is
to explain the behavior of macroscopic objects in three–dimensional space
in term of the motion of microscopic objects in three–dimensional space.
The difficult one is, in the GRW0 framework, to explain perceptions, as for
example physical space as it appears to us as being R3, while it is actually
RM . In the approach in terms of primitive ontology the difficult problem is
left to a future theory (of consciousness or a more complex physics depending
on what one’s view is), while physics is concerned only about the easy one:
once we have left perceptions out, we can dedicate physics to the description
and the explanation of the motion of bodies in three–dimensional space. On
Albert’s approach, in contrast, we are required to explain perceptions in order
to begin explaining everything else. Physics and the theory of perception are
completely merged and therefore everything becomes more difficult, if not
impossible, at any level. Notice that what is claimed here is not that we
should not aim at such a complete theory. But since it happens that we can
do physics without having to have a theory of consciousness, why not do
that?
7 Conclusion
As a conclusion, I believe that GRW in particular and any fundamental
physical theory in general should not be interpreted as a theory about the
time evolution of the wave function, but rather as the time evolution of a
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primitive ontology in three–dimensional space. This is a much more desirable
approach than others in the spirit of recovering our perception from the
behavior of an entity in some abstract space. In fact such a project is is
doomed to failure if physicalism is false, while it has not been done yet
and has been argued to be very difficult to obtain assuming the mind-body
problem can be solved in physics12.
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